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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2-2 from a Summary Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint which was entered June 23, 1986 by the 
District Court for the Second Judicial District, Hon. Rodney 
S. Page presiding. The Judgment incorporated two rulings on 
Defendant Clearfield City's Motions for Summary Judgment. 
In the first ruling, issued December 17, 1985, the District 
Court ruled that Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 as 
amended barred Plaintiffs1 cause of action; refused to 
consider the retroactive application of U.C.A. 63-30-3 as 
amended; found that the City was not estopped to claim the 
defense of governmental immunity by reason of payments made 
to Plaintiffs before suit was filed; and allowed Plaintiffs 
to amend their Complaint to state a cause of action under 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Following a hearing on Defendant's second Motion 
for Summary Judgment on January 30, 1986, the District Court 
ruled on April 29, 1986 that Plaintiffs had not suffered a 
taking of their property and inverse condemnation was not 
applicable; that Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution 
of Utah is not self-executing; and that Utah Code Annotated 
63-30-3 as amended precluded suit under Article I, Section 
22 of the Constitution and under U.C.A. 63-30-9, and should 
be applied retroactively. Judgment was entered accordingly 
on June 23, 1986 dismissing Plaintiffs1 Complaint with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 19753 Plaintiffs Rick and Cherlynn Hamblin 
purchased their home at 576 North Barlow Street, Clearfield, 
Davis County, and they have resided there continually since 
that time. (Record pages 1, 29, 58). 
Several years after Plaintiffs moved into their 
home, in 1978 or 1979, construction of Green Hills 
subdivision commenced near Plaintiffs1 home. New homes are 
still being added to the subdivision (Record page 29). As 
part of the construction of the Green Hills subdivision, 
Defendant Clearfield City permitted the contractor to 
elevate the property surrounding Plaintiffs1 home and change 
the grade or slope of the property (Record pages 29-30). 
Defendant City also allowed the construction of a storm 
system which channels all water draining from Green Hills 
subdivision to a point in front of and uphill from 
Plaintiffs* home (Record pages 30, 58). 
Plaintiffs began to experience flooding of their 
property for the first time in May of 1981, and have been 
flooded regularly since that date whenever there are heavy 
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rains (Record pages 2, 30-32, 50-58, 63-64). Plaintiffs are 
flooded at times when no other homes in the area experience 
flooding. 
Clearfield City reconstructed the intersection in 
front of Plaintiffs1 home in an attempt to alleviate the 
flooding, but the flooding continued. In or about November, 
1983, the City constructed a larger catch basin and an 
energy dispatcher north of Plaintifffs home, which also 
failed to alleviate the flooding (Record pages 2, 58). 
Defendant City reimbursed Plaintiffs for expenses 
incidental to cleanup of their property through October of 
1984, and paid for some repair work on the yard and 
driveway, but has refused to reimburse Plaintiffs for 
expenses caused by flooding since October, 1984 (Record 
pages 50-57, 63, 70). Defendant has never compensated 
Plaintiffs for the permanent damage to their home caused by 
flooding (Record pages 48, 102-103). 
Despite continued promises from Clearfield City to 
correct the problem and prevent flooding of Plaintiffs1 
home, the City has done nothing since 1983 to prevent the 
periodic flooding. Plaintiffs relied on the City's promises 
to correct the problem and prevent future flooding, and 
delayed filing suit until 1985, although they had been 
flooded consistently since 1981 (Record page 45). 
Because of the continued flooding, Plaintiffs have 
been forced to take time off work to clean up their 
property* Their yard has been damaged, the foundation of 
the home weakened and cracked, the concrete of the driveway 
and garage damaged, the top soil of the yard washed away. 
Water and mud flow into the house when flooding occurs and 
the musty smell remains after cleaning. Plaintiffs and 
their children now dread living in the home, but they have 
been unable to sell it in its current state (Record pages 2, 
48-51, 60, 63-64). 
Plaintiffs filed suit against Clearfield City on 
April 10, 1985, basing their cause of action on Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 63-30-8 and 9, after Defendant City 
refused to reimburse them for damages caused by flooding 
which occurred November 8, 1984, and refused to either pay 
for further repairs necessitated by years of flood damage or 
make Plaintiffs whole for the permanent damage done to their 
home property by flooding. (Record pages 1-3, 48, 102, 
103.) 
Defendant City filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In the ruling on that motion, issued December 17, 
1985, the District Court ruled that Plaintiffs' action was 
barred by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 as amended. 
In the same ruling, the District Court also allowed 
Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state a cause of 
action for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 
< = ; _ 
of the Constitution of Utah- (Record pages 27, 91, 92, 
106-107.) 
After hearing arguments on Defendant's second 
Motion for Summary Judgment on January 30, 1986, the 
District Court in a ruling issued April 29, 1986 granted 
Defendant's motion. Subsequently, on June 23, 1986, 
Judgment was entered dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with 
prejudice. (Record pages 93, 130, 148-153, 162-163.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs will show that the action of Clearfield 
City has caused continuing flooding of their property, which 
amounts to a taking of their property without the exercise 
of eminent domain. Plaintiffs claim the benefit of Article 
I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah, which guarantees 
compensation for "taking11 or "damage" of property, under the 
theory of inverse condemnation. This constitutional 
provision has been held to be self-executing, requiring no 
further statutory consent to suit, by most jurisdictions 
with similar provisions and there is Utah precedent for such 
a holding. 
The constitutionally-based theory of inverse 
condemnation is generally held to be an exception to 
governmental immunity, and the Legislature by amending Utah 
Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 could not use governmental 
immunity as a bar to compensation required by Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
The amendment to Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-30-3 should not be applied retroactively to cut off a 
cause of action which arose years before the amendment, 
particularly when the events giving rise to the amendment 
were totally unforeseeable and sporadic, in contrast to the 
continued flooding experienced by Plaintiffs. The amendment 
did not embody existing case law, and in the absence of a 
specific directive in the statute should not be applied 
retroactively. 
Since the Legislature has done nothing to change 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9, it is still valid law 
and should be applied to the instant action despite an 
apparent conflict with U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as amended* 
Defendant City, by its action in paying some claims, showed 
that it considered U.C.A. 63-30-9 to be valid. As 
Plaintiffs relied on Defendant's payments and promises, 
Defendant City should now be estopped to claim the defense 
of governmental immunity. 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT 
CLEARFIELD CITY COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 
TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah 
states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." Many other states 
have simiLar provisions in their constitutions; and the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
concludes with the words "...nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." These 
provisions provide a limitation on the power of eminent 
domain, since they require that compensation be paid for 
property taken by a governmental or quasi-governmental body. 
But the eminent domain statutes have no provision for an 
action by the owner of private property if a body with the 
power of eminent domain takes (or damages) private property 
without exercising that power. To fill this vacuum, the 
courts of many states, including Utah, have traditionally 
allowed a property owner to sue for the just compensation 
guaranteed by the Constitutions of Utah and of the United 
States, under a theory most commonly referred to as inverse 
condemnation. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has never used the 
term "inverse condemnation", it has recognized and upheld 
the principal of inverse condemnation. The Court said, in 
Hampton v. State, 21 U.2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969) that even 
such a property right as the right of access, light, or air 
"cannot be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially 
interfere with its proper use and enjoyment11 (445 P.2d at 
710) without due compensation. In Hampton, the plaintiffs 
claimed that as part of the construction of 1-15 through 
Clearfield, the State Road Commission substantially 
interfered with their right of access to their property. 
The trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign 
immunity, but the Supreme Court held that "insofar as they 
allege a substantial and material impairment of access to 
their property, constituting a taking," (445 P.2d at 712), a 
claim for "taking" could not be dismissed for sovereign 
immunity. The Court reversed and remanded to allow the 
plaintiffs to prove that there had been a "taking". 
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah, 221, 120 P. 
503 (1911), Salt Lake City lowered the grade of the street 
in front of the plaintifffs home by several feet, removing 
the soil supporting her retaining wall, and preventing the 
convenient ingress and egress plaintiff had earlier enjoyed. 
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This substantial interference with plaintiff's use of the 
property, which reduced her market value, amounted to a 
taking of the property for which plaintiff was awarded 
compensation even though she still had possession of her 
home and the City had never instituted eminent domain 
proceedings. 
The Court held in Hubble v. Cache County Drainage 
District No. 3, 120 Utah, 651, 237 P.2d 843 (1951) that a 
drainage district created by statute (which had the power of 
eminent domain) could not increase its system or facilities 
so as to create additional burdens on the land of those 
outside the district (or, by extension, outside the 
subdivision) without responding in damages, resorting to 
eminent domain, or being the subject of an injunction. 
Hubble imposes on any body with the power of eminent domain 
the responsibility to compensate for property taken by its 
actions. 
Plaintiff N. Rick Hamblin testified in his 
deposition regarding the effects of the flooding: 
Also, I have mud and water come into my 
house. The house has a musty smell. 
Right at this point on the northeast 
corner of the home the foundation is 
cracking. We never had any cracking up 
until one year ago. The cement is 
sinking inside the garage. There are 
cracks all over inside of the garage. 
There are pieces of cement falling off 
of the house underneath the one 
window... ." Record, page 48. 
Plaintiffs have previously replaced a damaged concrete 
driveway and restored washed-out landscaping. Every time it 
rains heavily, they are flooded and must take time off work 
to clean up the property. The worsening, permanent damage 
to the house, the persistent dank smell, and the anxiety of 
living in a house which they know will be flooded again, has 
reduced the value of Plaintiffs1 home, and turned their 
ffdream home11 into a ffnightmaren (record, page 48). 
Plaintiffs have experienced such substantial interference 
with their use of the home that they have tried to sell it 
and move out, because they do not feel they can safely and 
comfortably live in the home. However, they have been 
unable to sell the home. 
Because inverse condemnation and eminent domain 
suits are based on the same constitutional provision, the 
issues and the principles governing those issues are the 
same for both types of cases. The California Supreme Court 
has so held, in Breidert v. South P. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 
663 n.I, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903, 905 n.I, 394 P.2d 719, 721 n.I 
(1964). Thus, the standards for compensable damage or 
taking and for the amount of compensation are the same for 
inverse condemnation suits and eminent domain actions. In 
State v. Williams, 22 U.2d 331, 452 P.2d 881 (1969), the 
property owner in an eminent domain action was denied 
compensation for the depreciation to his property caused by 
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increased noise. In affirming, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated its position that Article I, Section 22 of the 
Constitution "means that some physical injury or damage to 
the property itself shall be committed, and does not include 
something which merely affects the senses of the persons who 
use the property." 452 P.2d at 883. See also 
Twenty-Second Corporation of Church, etc., v. Oregon Short 
Line Railroad, 36 Utah, 238, 103 P. 243, 23 L.R.A. , N.S. 
860. The Plaintiffs herein have experienced physical injury 
to their property, a fact which Defendant Clearfield City 
has never denied and instead tacitly acknowledged by 
reimbursing Plaintiffs for some of the repairs undertaken by 
Plaintiffs. The Court in Williams went on to say that the 
constitutional standard for recoverable damages was met: 
"... where there has been some physical 
disturbance of a right, either public or 
private, which the owner enjoys in 
connection with his property and which 
gives it additional value, and which 
causes him to sustain a special damage 
with repect to his property in excess of 
that sustained by the public generally. 
It requires a definite physical injury 
cognizable to the senses with a 
perceptible effect on the present market 
value; such as drying up wells and 
springs, destroying lateral supports, 
preventing surface waters from running 
off adjacent lands or running surface 
waters onto adjacent lands, or the 
depositing of cinders and other foreign 
materials on neighboring lands by the 
permanent operation of the business or 
improvement established on the adjoining 
lands." Emphasis added. 452 P.2d 881, 
883-884, quoting Board of Education of 
Logan City School District v. Croft, O" 
U.2d 310, 373 P.2d 697, 699. 
In both the Williams and Croft cases, there was no 
physical disturbance, but there can be no doubt that the 
Hamblins have experienced physical disturbance of their 
property rights. The Court, in Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 
U.2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966), while affirming an injunction 
against Brigham City, held that a property owner "has the 
right to be free from receiving waters on his lands to his 
damage which do not find their way in their natural course 
and under natural conditions.ff 413 P. 2d at 302. The 
Hamblins lived in their home for at least five years before 
they were flooded. The flooding only began after the 
natural grade of the land around the Hamblins* home was 
changed, and the natural course of water draining from that 
neighboring property altered so as to channel all water 
draining from the new subdivision to the Hamblins' property. 
Clearfield City clearly had the authority to take 
the Hamblins1 property via the exercise of eminent domain, 
but the City was and is unwilling to pay the Hamblins for 
the house and lot, or to compensate them for the irreparable 
damage done. Surely there could be no more direct damage 
than in this case, where the Plaintiffs1 house and property 
are being destroyed around them by waters intentionally 
channeled to flow to their property. The Hamblins1 home 
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will inevitably become uninhabitable, if it has not already 
reached that stage. The City, which has a duty to protect 
Plaintiffs in their safe enjoyment of their home, has 
instead become the instrument depriving them of the use and 
enjoyment of their property. Having in effect, if not in 
fact, condemned Plaintiffs1 property, Defendant City should 
be required to compensate Plaintiffs for their loss. 
POINT II 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22, REQUIRING THAT DEFENDANT 
CITY COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS, IS SELF EXECUTING. 
Webber v. Salt Lake City, supra, and the cases 
which followed it did not question the proposition that 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah was 
self-executing, requiring no further statutory consent to 
suit. Approximately half the states of the United States 
have similar constitutional provisions, and the overwhelming 
majority of those states consider such provisions to be 
self-executing. See Judge Bullockfs dissent to Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1123 n. 5 for a list of the states 
with similar constitutional provisions and n. 6 for a list 
of those which consider them self-executing. 
Arvo Van Alstyne, in an article which "explores 
the extent to which public liability in inverse condemnation 
may, conformably to the United States Constitution, be 
modified and regulated by state constitutional changes or 
^14-
statutory enactments11 has stated repeatedly that the 
California constitutional provision which provides that 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation having first been made to, or 
paid into court for, the owner... ." is considered 
self-executing by the courts of California. Van Alstyne, 
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of 
Legislative Power, 19 Stan.L.Rev. 727, 729 (1967); Article 
I, Section 14, Constitution of California. 
He goes so far as to say that, following the 
enactment of California's Tort Claims Act which purports to 
cut off some tort actions against government bodies, 
"injured property owners may be expected to seek 
redress—-and thus circumvent legislative policy—by resort 
to the self-executing constitutional remedy". Van Alstyne, 
op. cit. at 741. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court, without 
overruling Webber, held in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 
10 U.2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960) that Article I, Section 22 
of the Constitution of Utah was not self-executing, and that 
in order to recover in an action for inverse condemnation, a 
plaintiff would have to rely on a statute, giving the 
state's consent to suit in addition to the constitutional 
provision. Even the Fairclough case did not bar recovery 
altogether under inverse condemnation; thus, in Hampton v* 
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State, 21 U.2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969) the Court allowed 
recovery by plaintiffs who relied on Article I, Section 22 
and a statute (now re-enacted as Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Section 63-30-6) which gave consent to a suit "for recovery 
of any property real or personal or for the possession 
thereof or to quiet title thereto... ." 
Despite vigorous dissents in Fairclough and 
following cases, the Court has in recent years insisted that 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah is not 
self-executing, without overruling the earlier cases which 
held otherwise. So there is, in fact, precedent in Utah for 
both positions. 
Surely the constitutional provision is no 
protection if the Legislature can cut off the right of 
recovery at any time. The sounder policy must be that the 
constitutional provision is self-executing, as so many other 
states have held. 
This does not mean that the Legislature is 
completely powerless to regulate such actions. California 
has always considered their constitutional provision, in its 
essence the same as ours, to be self-executing; 
nevertheless, in a leading case, the California Supreme 
Court has stated that this constitutional right "is not 
exempt from reasonable statutory regulations or enactments". 
Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 725, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (1942). 
The legislature is free to establish procedures for inverse 
condemnation suits which "may tend to eliminate ill-founded 
claims and discourage frivolous litigation" so long as the 
right to compensation is not completely denied or abrogated. 
Van Alstyne, OJD. cit. at 740. To hold otherwise is to put 
the constitutional right at the mercy of legislators who are 
more interested in balancing the budget than in protecting 
the rights of citizens. Plaintiffs have met all the 
procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act 5 and should be allowed to maintain their action solely 
on the basis of Article I, Section 22. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 63-30-3 AND 63-30-9 ARE 
IN CONFLICT AND SECTION 9, NOT SECTION 3, 
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE INSTANT ACTION. 
Plaintiffs based one claim for recovery on Utah 
Code Annotated 63-30-9. The Court granted defendant a 
summary judgment on this claim, finding that the claim was 
barred by U.C.A. 63-30-3 as amended in 1984 and 1985. As 
amended, U.C.A. 63-30-3 declares governmental entities 
immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
"the management of flood waters and other natural disasters 
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems... ." Section 3, as amended, directly 
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conflicts with Section 9, which states: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective 
condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir or other 
public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective 
conditions.,f 
The Legislature could have repealed or amended Section 9 
when they amended Section 3, but they did not. Therefore, 
the inevitable conclusion is that Section 3 was not intended 
to affect the waiver of immunity in Section 9, and the 
phrase at the beginning of Section 3, "Except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter..." modifies not just the 
first sentence of the section but the whole of the U.C.A. 
63-30-3. 
Additionally, Section 3 as amended presumes that 
the damage and injury resulting from the activities is 
unavoidable, and occurs during or as a result of an unusual 
and extreme natural phenomenon. The addition of the phrase 
"and other natural disasters" by the 1985 Legislature 
indicates the legislative intent to deal with unusual and 
extreme conditions, not with a problem which arises several 
times a year. The problem experienced by the Hamblins has 
occurred regularly, at times when no other storm sewer would 
pose a problem. In fact, the Hamblins had no such problem, 
_ 1 ft_ 
even in the heaviest rainstorm, when there was no storm 
sewer in place at all. Not until the grade of the property 
around them was changed for the new subdivision did rain 
waters pose a problem. It is significant that when the 
Hamblins have experienced heavy flooding, their neighbors 
have had no problems. Natural phenomena are not so 
selective. 
To find that Section 3, dealing with the 
management of flood waters and the operation of flood and 
storm systems, bars application of Section 9, referring to 
"dams and reservoirs or other public improvements," could 
lead to a morass of inconsistency. For example, while most 
dams and reservoirs in Utah are built for water storage 
purposes, they must also serve flood control purposes. If 
water were to be rapidly drained out of a reservoir, causing 
flooding downstream, and the State or a subdivision thereof 
were found to have initiated the drainage. Section 9 would 
allow recovery for flood damage. However, if Section 3 
applied, the operators of the reservoir could claim to be 
managing flood waters and claim immunity from suit. Thus, 
any public improvement which serves more than one function 
could be immune from suit or not, depending on the function 
the improvement served at the time of the injury. 
Obviously, in most instances it would be impossible to 
determine what one function was being served at the time of 
the injury. 
Clearly, U.C.A. 63-30-3 and 63-30-9 are in 
conflict, and Section 3 is overly broad for the purpose for 
which it is intended. The Legislature must have intended 
Section 3 to apply only in extraordinary circumstances, 
while Section 9 would continue to apply to all other 
problems which would arise from the use of public 
improvements, such as the problems experienced by the 
Hamblins. The Court should apply Section 9 to the instant 
action, until the Legislature indicates otherwise by 
amending or repealing Section 9. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, SECTION 63-30-3, AS AMENDED 
CANNOT CUT OFF PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHT TO COMPENSATION UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The Legislature cannot by statute abrogate a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of Utah. Some provision for recovery of 
compensation must be made. But in 1984 and 1985, the Utah 
Legislature attempted to deny this right of compensation by 
amending Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-3 to read 
in part: 
?f
. . .The management of flood waters and 
other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities.M 
Insofar as this statute purports to cut off Plaintiffs1 
right to compensation without providing an alternate remedy 
allowing Plaintiffs to recover for their loss or forcing 
Defendant City to condemn Plaintiffs1 house and property, it 
is overly broad and directly conflicts with the 
Constitution. And since Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution refers to damage or taking, and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution refers only to 
taking, while U.C.A. 63-30-3 as amended deals only with 
damage, the statute cannot abrogate Plaintiffs' claim to 
compensation for the taking of their property. As discussed 
earlier, the substantial interference with the use of the 
property which Plaintiffs have experienced amounts to a 
taking as defined in earlier cases. 
Van Alstyne has stated: "The law of inverse 
condemnation, which fulfills constitutional requirements, 
has long been recognized as a fundamental exception to the 
general doctrine of governmental- tort immunity." Van 
Alstyne, op. cit. at 728. Webber v. Salt Lake City could 
not have been decided in favor of Mrs. Webber without 
applying this principle in the face of a more strict 
governmental immunity than applies today. Even in a time 
when courts agonized over the distinction between 
"proprietary" and "governmental" functions, the Utah Supreme 
Court held simply on the basis of Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution that Mrs. Webber was entitled to 
compensation for the substantial interference with access 
which she had suffered. 
The Plaintiff in the case of Reeder v. Brigham 
City, supra, experienced flooding problems similar to the 
Hamblins1. When a subdivision was built on land previously 
used as an orchard, a drainage system was installed and Mr. 
Reeder!s lands were flooded by spring runoff and after heavy 
rains. Like the Hamblins, Mr. Reeder was never flooded 
prior to construction of the drainage system for the new 
subdivision. The trial court in that case found that 
Brigham City had diverted the waters from their natural 
drainage area and forced the water into ditches which, 
unable to handle the increased runoff, overflowed causing 
flooding of Mr. Reederfs property. The Court affirmed an 
injunction against Brigham City, saying Mr. Reeder nhas the 
right to be free from receiving waters on his lands to his 
damage which do not find their way in their natural course 
and under natural conditions." 413 P. 2d 300, 302. The 
Court, however, agreed with Brigham City's claim that it was 
not liable for damages because it nwas acting in a 
governmental capacity'1, citing Cobia v. Roy City, 12 U.2d 
375, 366 P.2d 986, (1961), as the basis for this ruling. 
The Cobia decision, the sole ground for denial of 
damages in Reeder, has since been overruled by Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982), as being 
contrary to the definition of governmental function 
enunciated by the Court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., Utah, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980) and reaffirmed in Johnson 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 629 P.2d 432 (1981). 
The current test for governmental immunity laid 
out in Standiford is "whether the activity under 
consideration is of such unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential 
to the core of governmental activity.fl 605 P. 2d 1230, 
1236-1237* 
The Court in Johnson explained that this test 
"...does not refer to what government may do, but to what 
government alone must do.?f 629 P.2d 432, 434. 
Applying these tests to the operation of a sewer 
system in Thomas v. Clearfield City, supra, the Court stated 
that- ffthe operation of a sanitary sewer system is a 
governmental function for purposes of the municipality's 
authority to operate, but it does not follow from this that 
the function automatically qualifies for governmental 
immunity as essential to the core of the governmental 
activity." 642 P. 2d 737, 739. The Court then concluded 
that the collection and disposal of sewage is not an 
activity that government alone must do, and pointed out that 
in many areas of the state, private entities perform this 
function subject to government standards. 
Likewise, private entities can and do provide 
storm drainage systems. Flood control is not an activity 
that "government alone must dof!, and in fact eminent domain 
power is authorized for private and quasi-governmental 
entities to carry out such activities. Clearly, flood 
control does not meet the current test of governmental 
immunity; therefore, governmental immunity is not a valid 
defense to Plaintiffs' action. 
POINT V 
SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE APPLIED 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 63-30-3 
RETROACTIVELY TO BAR PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM? 
Plaintiffs were first flooded in 1981, and the 
damage for which they ask compensation began to accrue at 
that same time. "It is a rule of universal application that 
a cause or right of action arises the moment an action may 
be maintained to enforce it . . . .If Sweetser v. Fox, 43 
Utah", 40 at 48, 134 P. 599 at 602 (1913). This rule was 
reaffirmed in Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah, 
475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933); OfHair v. Kounalis, 23 U.2d 355, 
463 P.2d 799 (1970); and Ash v. State, Utah, 572 P.2d 1374 
(1977). When this rule is applied to the instant action, it 
is clear that the Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant 
Clearfield City arose in May, 1981, when they were first 
flooded. 
Although Defendant Clearfield City, directly or 
through its insurer, reimbursed Plaintiffs for labor to 
clean up after flooding, and for some work on the yard and 
driveway. Plaintiffs have never been compensated for the 
permanent damage to their house and yard, and have never 
been made whole. 
The injury to their property is permanent, with 
consequences which are expected to continue indefinitely, 
and damages which are foreseeable. Therefore, this case is 
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properly a single action to recover all damages at once, and 
the cause of action arose at the time of the first flooding. 
Since the cause of action arose in 1981, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 63-30-3 as amended applies retroactively to bar 
Plaintiffs1 claim if it applies at all. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-3 states: "No 
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." Therefore, in the absence of an 
express directive in the statute, U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as 
amended should not be applied retroactively. In the case of 
Frank v. State, Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (1980), the Court was 
faced with a similar claim: that an earlier amendment to 
U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 should be retroactively applied to 
bar a suit against the state. The Court recognized that 
there, as here, there was language indicating a legislative 
intent for retroactive application, but no such directive in 
the statute itself. Rather than apply retroactively an 
amendment which did not by its terms require such 
retroactive application, the Court held that operation of 
the University Medical Center was a governmental function 
"as contemplated by the statute prior to amendment." 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court has already held that the operation of a 
storm drainage system is a governmental function. Reeder v. 
Brigham City, 17 U.2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966). However, as 
noted in Point IV above, the Court in Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City, supra, has severely restricted the circumstances 
under which a claim of governmental immunity for performance 
of a governmental function will be allowed. U.C.A. Section 
63-30-3 as it stood at the time Plaintiffs1 claim arose 
stated: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a government function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from 
an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care cliical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
Thus, the mere fact that Defendant was performing a 
governmental function was not an absolute bar to a suit for 
damages--the legislature has allowed exceptions to the 
immunity provided for governments performing governmental 
functions, such as those incorporated in U.C.A. Section 
63-30-8 and 63-30-9. But the 1984 amendment to U.C.A 
Section 63-30-3, by creating an absolute bar and removing 
those exceptions, cuts off any possibility of suit for some 
pre-existing, valid claims. In the absence of clear 
language in the statute directing retroactive application, 
the 1984 amendment should not be applied to a claim which 
arose long before the amendment was conceived, and before 
the once-in-a-lifetime statewide flooding occurred which 
prompted the amendment. Far from requiring retroactive 
application^ Frank v. State, supra, indicates that the Court 
will be reluctant to apply any amendment to this statute 
retroactively in the absence of an express direction to do 
so. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT CLEARFIELD CITY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY SINCE IT DID PAY SOME 
DAMAGES AND ADMIT LIABILITY THROUGH OCTOBER, 1984, AND 
PLAINTIFFS, ACTING IN RELIANCE ON DEFENDANT'S ACTION, 
DELAYED FILING SUIT AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Defendant claims that its actions with reference 
to the storm drainage system were a governmental function 
under Reeder v. Brigham City, supra, and therefore, immune 
from suit even before the 1984 amendment to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-30-3. If that is so, Clearfield City 
would have been immune from suit for damages at all times 
Plaintiffs were flooded. Nevertheless, Defendant, directly 
or through its insurer, paid invoices presented by 
Plaintiffs for time, clean-up and some repairs through 
October 1984, including at least one payment for flooding 
which occurred September 11, 1984, after the 1984 amendment 
to Section 63-30-3 took effect, and made promises. Record 
pages 50-57. 
Had the Plaintiffs filed suit against Clearfield 
City when their claim first arose, their case would have 
worked its way through the judicial system long before the 
Utah Legislature considered the 1984 amendment. Instead, 
Plaintiffs relied on the Defendants pattern of continuing 
payments and promises to correct the drainage problem, and 
delayed filing suit, expecting to be able to resolve the 
problem with the City without resorting to legal action. 
Defendant Clearfield City, shoud not now be permitted to 
argue that it is immune from suit and has been all along, 
since Plaintiffs delayed legal action in an attempt to 
settle with the City, and the City admitted liability for 
the problem and paid some claims. It will work manifest 
injustice against Plaintiffs to allow Defendant to rely on 
immunity at this late date, especially an absolute immunity 
conferred by a statute passed long after the claim arose and 
after Plaintiff had begun to work with Defendant to settle 
the claim. The Utah Supreme Court has refused to permit a 
defense of govevernmental immunity where it would be 
inequitable to do so. Bowles v. State of Utah, Utah, 652 
P.2nd 1345 (1982); El Rancho Enterprises, Inc., v. Murray 
City Corp., Utah, 565 P.2nd 778 (1977). The Court in Reeder 
v. Brigham City, supra, in affirming the injunction against 
Brigham City, said that the Plaintiff f,has the right to be 
free from receiving water on his land to his damage which do 
not find their way in their natural course and under natural 
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conditions." 413 P.2nd at 302. The Defendant Clearfield 
City3 by its actions
 5 has shown it agrees with the Court in 
Reeder, and should be estopped from claiming otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The law is clear that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
compensation from Defendant if5 as they claim, their 
property has been so damaged that in effect it has been 
taken from them. Governmental immunity in general and as 
enacted in U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as amended cannot bar this 
right to compensation. The Judgment should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of 
September, 1986. 
KELLY G. CARDON 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/ 
APPELLANTS 
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Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and to Bryan A. Larson, Esq., Christensen, Jensen & 
Powell, Attorneys at Law, 900 Kearns Building, 136 South 
Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this the 
day of September', 1986, postage prepaid. 
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH MICHAc' G AM pur« n co* 
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RICK HAMBLIN and : 
CHERLYNN HAMBLIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF CLEARFIELD, 
Defendant• 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 37210 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of December, 
1985, the Court having reviewed the file in the matter and the 
Memorandums of counsel and having heard the arguments of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises hereby makes it ruling 
as follows: 
The Court hereby rules that §63-30-3 bars plaintiffs1 
cause of action for damages as against these defendants. 
The Court does not reach the question of retroactivity 
of §63-30-3 as the evidence is uncontroverted that any and all 
claims of the plaintiffs were paid up through October of 1984 
and that any cause of action of plaintiffs for damages arose 
after that date. 
The Court further rules that the City is not estopped 
from asserting said section as a bar to any liability for reason 
of its having paid claims of the plaintiffs which occured prior 
to October of 1984. 
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The Court does not reach the question of the unconstitu-
tional taking raised by the plaintiff at the time of argument 
as the same was not set forth in its original Complaint, but 
will treat plaintiffs1 argument as a Motion to Amend the Complaint 
to include a claim for unlawful taking. The Court will grant 
the motion and allow defendant ten (10) days to respond to the 
Amended Complaint as to the unlawful taking. 
DATED this n ^ day of December, A.D., 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling to Kelly G. Cardon, Attorney for the 
plaintiffs, 208% 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Mr. Henry 
Heath, Attorney for the defendant, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the /5^ day of December, 1985, 
postage prepaid. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT AUri\!:.CLEPK 
2 M : C!07.YiCf COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UT^EJ n£ v 
CEi'Ui r CEito 
RICK & CHERLYNN HAMBLIN, , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF CLEARFIELD, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 37210 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on defendant's second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Amended Complaint and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises and having reviewed 
memorandum of counsel submitted herein, hereby rules as follows: 
First, as to plaintiff's motion to reconsider the Court's 
prior partial summary judgment, the Court feels that Utah law and 
the Rules of Procedure do not preclude the Court's consideration 
of a motion to reconsider, but that any decision to reconsider 
should be exercised by the Court with care and only in very 
limited circumstances where new evidence or new law can be 
presented which was not available at the initial hearing and 
which could not have been known by counsel through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence. 
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Such is not the case here and, therefore, the Court denies 
the motion to reconsider its prior ruling granting the defendant 
a partial summary judgment. 
There remains the question of whether these plaintiffs may 
maintain an action pursuant to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution based upon their amended complaint. 
Article I, Section 22 provides that property should not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
The law seems clear in the State of Utah that Article I, 
Section 22 is not self-executing and that in order for plaintiffs 
to sue pursuant to that provision there must be legislative 
authority for said action. Such authority has been given in the 
areas of eminent domain and in certain areas where governmental 
immunity has been waived by statute under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that there 
has been no taking by a governmental agency as is contemplated 
under the eminent domain statute and therefore action thereunder 
is not applicable; nor is this a case where the doctrine of 
"inverse condemnation" would be applicable, in the limited scope 
recognized by Utah Law. 
The remaining question is whether immunity from suit has 
been waived by the legislature under the Governmental Immunity 
Act so as to allow suit to be filed. 
Section 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) was amended by 
the legislature in 1984 so as to preclude specifically any 
governmental liability arising out of management of flood 
waters . and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm water system and specifically defines such activities 
as governmental functions. 
Prior to that enactment, cases involving governmental 
immunity had turned on the question as to whether the particular 
governmental activity was of such a unique nature that it could 
only be performed by a governmental agency. 
It appears from caselaw that the regulation of storm water 
was and is such an activity. The legislative enactment in 1984 
as to storm water appears to be merely a codification of prior 
case law. 
The court therefore concludes that Section 63-10-3 as 
amended precludes plaintiff's action in this particular case and 
rather than authorizing action pursuant to Article I, Section 22 
in fact precludes it. Further that since the amendment to 
Section 63-10-3 is merely a codification of prior caselaw, said 
section so far as it applies to storm waters should be applied 
retroactive. 
Insofar as it may appear that Section 63-10-13 as amended 
may be in conflict with Section 63-10-9, since 63-10-13 is the 
later pronouncement by the legislature, any conflict between the 
two sections must be resolved in favor of the former section. 
ADDENDUM B (PAGE 3) 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby granted. 
DATED this 2 9 ^ day of April, A.D. 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE" 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling to Kelly Cardon, 427 27th, Ogden, Utah 
84401 and to Mr. Henry Heath, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 9 
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the <§t?U day of 
April, 1986, postage prepaid. 
Deputy Clerk 
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Henry E. Heath 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICK HAMBLIN and ] 
CHERLYN HAMBLIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF CLEARFIELD, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
> PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
1 Civil No. 37,210 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment with the initial hearing being held 
on the 12th day of December, 1985, before the above-entitled 
court with the Honorable Rodney F. Page, District Judge, presiding. 
The parties were represented by counsel of record. The court having 
reviewed the Memoranda of the parties and having heard arguments 
of counsel, ruled that plaintiffs' cause of action for damages 
against defendant was barred by §63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
and reserved its ruling on certain other issues and granted 
plaintiffs the right to amend their Complaint. 
Whereupon plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint to which 
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defendant filed an Answer and moved the court for a second time 
to grant its Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 
Amended Complaint, The court received additional Memoranda and 
held a further hearing with counsel for the parties present. 
Whereupon the court ruled that §63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended in 1984 should be applied retro-actively to bar plaintiffs1 
claim and that said statute is not a violation of Article 1, 
§22 of the Utah Constitution. 
NOW THEREFORE, the court being fully advised in the premises 
and based upon the foregoing and having specifically found that there 
is no genuine issue of fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, the court does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that plaintiffs1 Complaint against 
defendant be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice, with 
no costs awarded. 
DATED this 2.3^ day of June, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
D 
J^J 
Rodney St Page 
DistritH: Judge 
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ADDENDUM D 
STATUTES 
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment provides as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of 
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment in Section 1 
provides as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22 provides as 
follows: 
Private property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-3, as amended, 
provides as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any.injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing 
home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health 
care clinical training program conducted 
in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters 
and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-8, provides as 
follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused 
by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of any highway, road, street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-9, provides as 
follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused 
from a dangerous or defective condition 
of any public building, structure, dam, 
reservoir or other public improvement. 
Immunity is not waived for latent 
defective conditions. 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 68-3-3, provides as 
follows: 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared. 
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